Adapting to Climate Change:An Integrated Biophysical and Economic Assessment for Mozambique by Arndt, Channing et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Adapting to Climate Change
Arndt, Channing; Strzepek, Kenneth ; Tarp, Finn; Thurlow, James ; Fant, Charles ;  Wright,
Len
Publication date:
2010
Document version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (APA):
Arndt, C., Strzepek, K., Tarp, F., Thurlow, J., Fant, C., & Wright, L. (2010). Adapting to Climate Change: An
Integrated Biophysical and Economic Assessment for Mozambique. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
 Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2010 
1 University of Copenhagen, 2 MIT, 3 UNU-WIDER, 4 University of Colorado, corresponding author: 
james@wider.unu.edu.  
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on Development under Climate Change, 
directed by Channing Arndt. 
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to the project by the Finnish Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida, and the 
financial contributions to the research programme by the governments of Denmark (Royal Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs), and the United Kingdom (Department for International Development—DFID). 
ISSN 1798-7237 ISBN 978-92-9230-338-9 
Working Paper No. 2010/101 
 
Adapting to Climate Change 
 
An Integrated Biophysical and Economic 
Assessment for Mozambique 
 
Channing Arndt1, Kenneth Strzepek2, 
Finn Tarp3, James Thurlow3,  
Charles Fant4 and Len Wright4 
 
September 2010 
 
Abstract 
Mozambique, like many African countries, is already highly susceptible to climate 
variability and extreme weather events. Climate change threatens to heighten this 
vulnerability. In order to evaluate potential impacts and adaptation options for 
Mozambique, we develop an integrated modelling framework that translates atmospheric 
changes from general circulation model projections into biophysical outcomes via 
detailed hydrologic, crop, hydropower and infrastructure models. These sector models 
simulate a historical baseline and four extreme climate change scenarios. Sector results 
are then passed down to a dynamic computable general equilibrium model, which is …/ 
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used to estimate economy-wide impacts on national welfare, as well as the total cost of 
damages caused by climate change. Potential damages without changes in policy are 
significant; our discounted estimates range from US$2.3 to US$7.4 billion during 2003–
50. Our analysis identifies improved road design and agricultural sector investments as 
key ‘no-regret’ adaptation measures, alongside intensified efforts to develop a more 
flexible and resilient society. Our findings also support the need for cooperative river 
basin management and the regional coordination of adaptation strategies. 
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1 Introduction 
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world. Despite notable progress since 
establishing peace in 1992, it faces many development challenges, including 
pronounced and widespread income poverty, low life expectancy, and wide gaps in 
educational achievement. Moreover, the country experiences high levels of climate 
variability and extreme weather events (i.e., droughts, floods and tropical cyclones). 
Droughts are the most frequent disaster, occurring every three to four years, and are a 
major constraint to development, since most of the country’s population, especially the 
poor, reside in rural areas and rely on rainfed agriculture. Mozambique also lies at the 
end of numerous transnational river basins, and so flooding in its deltas is a perennial 
threat to both farmers and infrastructure, especially when coupled with cyclonic storm 
surges. For example, more than half a million people (i.e., 3 per cent of the total 
population) were displaced in 2000 when Mozambique experienced its worst flood in 50 
years. Finally, Mozambique’s internal climate characteristics vary, with subtropical 
climates in the North and Centre of the country, and dry arid conditions in the South.  
Current challenges of climate variability and weather risk are compounded by climate 
change, but little is presently known about how Mozambique will be affected and how it 
might adapt its policies to offset potential damages. Such impact assessments are 
difficult due to the inherent multidisciplinary, multisector and economy-wide nature of 
the analytical issues involved. In this paper we describe an integrated modelling 
framework that helps us translate a set of climate projections into biophysical and 
economic impacts. The model is the result of concerted research efforts over several 
years, combining biophysical and economic insights and projections, making it possible 
to analyse adaptation options within a coherent analytical framework. We apply this 
framework to Mozambique as an illustrative case, but the model is also in the process of 
being applied to other countries within the context of ongoing UNU-WIDER research. 
In our analysis we rely on four climate change scenarios to reflect the full variation in 
global and local climate projections. Four direct impact channels are considered: 
energy, infrastructure, agriculture and coastal zones. Integrated river basin and water 
resource models help estimate streamflows and water availability, which then 
determines electricity generation. Floods predicted by the river basin models damage 
road infrastructure and raise maintenance costs. Detailed crop models capture yield 
deviations based on temperature and precipitation projections, and the results of a global 
model determine crop land losses due to rising sea levels. All these sector-level impacts 
are then passed to a dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model, which we 
use to estimate economy-wide impacts of climate change on socioeconomic variables, 
such as economic growth and welfare. To assess the economic cost of climate change 
we specify a baseline scenario that reflects development trends and, policies and 
priorities in the absence of climate change, before finally moving on to simulating 
alternative adaptation responses and our discussion and conclusions. 
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2 Integrated modelling framework 
2.1 Selecting climate change scenarios  
There is considerable uncertainty over future climate change. Existing general 
circulation models (GCM) produce a wide range of future scenarios, especially when 
examined at the country-level (see Solomon et al. 2007). Moreover, apart from 
differences in the science of modelling global climate systems, there is also uncertainty 
over how the global economy will evolve in coming decades. This means that GCMs 
have to project a number of possible ‘emission scenarios’ based on different 
assumptions about future populations, technological advancements, and global 
agreements to reduce carbon emissions.  
In order to capture the full range of possible climate change realizations, we select four 
projections representing the total possible variation in precipitation outcomes at the 
global- and country-levels. The first two scenarios are the driest and wettest global 
projections chosen from all possible GCM/emission scenario pairings. We call these the 
‘global dry’ and ‘global wet’ scenarios. However, the driest global projection is not 
necessarily the driest for Mozambique. Thus, in the second two scenarios we selected 
the driest and wettest projections for Mozambique (i.e., ‘local dry’ and ‘local wet’).1 As 
shown in Table 1, the national climate moisture indices (CMI) for the global scenarios 
are bounded by the more extreme outcomes of the local scenarios. In fact, the global dry 
projection raises the CMI for Mozambique, while the global wet scenario reduces it 
slightly. 
 
Table 1: Climate changes in Mozambique in 2050 in the global and local scenarios 
 Global wet Global dry Local wet Local dry 
Temperature change (Celsius)     
North region 1.8903 1.2270 1.4654 1.3745 
Centre region 1.8089 1.4021 1.4866 1.7759 
South region 1.5782 1.5055 1.3625 1.6619 
Precipitation (% change)     
North region 1.9398 3.4973 18.2335 -22.4636 
Centre region -2.1171 -6.9608 6.3606 -27.1855 
South region 1.4956 -11.8690 15.5954 -21.7373 
Climate moisture index -0.6 9.3 33.0 -58.6 
Source: Own calculations using GCM results (CSIRO, NCAR, UKMO and IPSL). 
 
                                                
1 GCM/emissions scenario pairings: global dry (CSIRO-MK3.0 a2), global wet (NCAR-CCSM a1b), 
local dry (UKMO-HADGEM1 a1b) and local wet (IPSL-CM4 a2).  
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All subnational regions in Mozambique are expected to experience a one to two degree 
Celsius increase in temperature by 2050. This increase occurs under both wet and dry 
scenarios, and reflects the general consensus that temperatures will rise as a result of 
climate change (Solomon et al. 2007). Since our selection of climate change projections 
was based on precipitation, we expect to find greater variation in average precipitation 
changes in our four scenarios for Mozambique. However, at least some of the variation 
in precipitation reflects a lack of consensus amongst GCMs over precipitation 
projections, with these models often predicting opposite outcomes (Solomon et al. 
2007). For example, average precipitation declines by 2050 under the local dry scenario, 
but increases under the local wet scenario. Differences across projections are even more 
pronounced at daily and monthly time scales. Overall, however, the GCMs suggest that 
Mozambique’s climate will become hotter, and more variable and uncertain, as a result 
of climate change. 
We use historical monthly climate data (0.5°×0.5°) from the Climate Research Unit for 
1951–2000 to produce a baseline ‘no climate change’ scenario for each subnational 
region. Our baseline scenario assumes that future weather patterns will retain the 
characteristics of historical climate variability. It should be noted that the purpose of the 
baseline scenario is not to predict future weather patterns, but to provide a 
counterfactual for the climate change scenarios. Therefore, taking the baseline scenario, 
we overlay a ten-year moving average of the monthly deviations in temperature and 
precipitation predicted by the GCMs. This procedure produces four ‘synthetic’ climate 
projections containing both current climate variability (i.e., the historical baseline) and 
future climate changes. Later in this paper we will estimate the biophysical and 
economic impacts of climate change by comparing the results of each of the four 
climate change scenarios with those of the baseline scenario.  
2.2 Linking climate change to biophysical and economic outcomes 
The atmospheric projections for the baseline and climate change scenarios are translated 
into economic impacts via a series of specialized sector models. Figure 1 shows the 
flow of information through the integrated river basin and water resource models down 
to three sector models that estimate impacts on agriculture, energy and infrastructure. 
River basin models determine streamflows for water resource models, which then 
estimate water availability for hydropower models. The river basin model also predicts 
flood frequency and severity, which, together with precipitation and temperature, 
determines road damages in the infrastructure model. Climate projections directly affect 
agricultural production in the crop models. Finally, biophysical results are passed down 
to a multisector economic model that estimates the economy-wide impacts of climate 
change. We also include a fourth sectoral impact channel that determines land losses 
from sea-level rise. Before describing the sector and economy-wide models, we first 
review the two water-related models. 
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Figure 1: Integrated modelling framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Authors. 
Our ‘CLIRUN’ river basin model is an extension of a class of hydrologic models 
developed specifically to analyse the effects of climate change on runoff. Earlier 
applications of the model estimated single-layer lumped watershed runoff using mean 
monthly and annual rainfall (Kaczmarek 1993, 1996; Yates 1996). The current version 
of CLIRUN is extended to more accurately capture the tails of the runoff distribution.2 
For this, the model adopts the two-layer approach of Gupta and Sorooshian (1983, 
1985) that captures both quick and slow runoff. Runoff is modelled as a one-
dimensional location at the mouth of a catchment. Water enters CLIRUN via 
precipitation and leaves via evapotranspiration and runoff. The difference between 
inflow and outflow is the change in soil or groundwater storage.  
CLIRUN uses the modified Hargreaves method to estimate potential evapotranspiration 
(Hargreaves and Allen 2003), while actual evapotranspiration is a function of this 
potential and the soil moisture state (see Allen et al. 1998). The soil water model 
includes soil and groundwater layers, corresponding to quick and slow runoff responses 
to precipitation, respectively. The soil layer captures the effective precipitation that 
directly enters stream systems (i.e., a function of soil surfaces) as well as runoff via soil 
                                                
2 For a detailed description and early application of the extended CLIRUN model, see Strzepek et al. 
(2008).  
Runoff 
General circulation 
models (GCM) 
River basin models 
(CLIRUN) 
Crop models 
(CLICROP) 
Hydropower 
models (IMPEND) 
Infrastructure 
model (CLIROAD) 
Economy-wide 
model (DCGE) 
Water resource
models (WRM) 
Temperature 
Precipitation 
Floods 
Crop yields  Energy supply  
Road network 
length 
Land inundation 
from sea-level rise 
(DIVA) 
Streamflow
Evapotranspiration 
Irrigation 
water demand 
 5
infiltration. Non-linear equations determine the volumes of water leaving the soil as 
runoff, percolating to groundwater, and entering soil storage. The groundwater layer 
receives percolated water from the soil layer, and slow runoff is then a linear function of 
groundwater storage. CLIRUN is calibrated using (0.5°×0.5°) historical runoff data 
from the Global Data Runoff Centre. CLIRUN models are developed for all 98 
catchment areas within Mozambique’s 16 river basins. Catchment runoffs are then 
combined to produce total streamflow estimates for each river basin. 
Modelling transboundary river basins is crucial since Mozambique lies downstream of 
most countries in Southern Africa. For example, Mozambique is the terminal point for 
the large Zambezi and Limpopo river basins, which cover 6 per cent of Africa’s total 
landmass and contain two of the continent’s largest dams. Being furthest downstream 
provides Mozambique with good opportunities for water storage, hydropower and 
irrigation. However, it also makes the country vulnerable to flooding and changes in 
upstream reservoir policies. Therefore, the estimated streamflows from CLIRUN are 
passed down to a water resource model (WRM) that simulates the management of all 
transboundary river basins within Mozambique and upstream. The WRM exogenously 
determines water allocation for industrial and domestic use, and then optimizes storage 
capacity and irrigation flows so as to maximize net benefits.  
Sector model 1: hydropower  
Hydropower generation relies on a combination of flow and elevation drop of water to 
generate electricity by turning turbines. There are four large-scale hydroelectric 
facilities in Mozambique, although the Cahora Bassa dam on the Zambezi River 
presently accounts for over 95 per cent of production. Electricity generation currently 
exceeds domestic demand, making Mozambique a net exporter of electricity to 
neighbouring countries.  
We use a hydropower planning model called ‘IMPEND’ that was originally developed 
for Ethiopia (i.e., the Investment Model for Planning Ethiopian Nile Development) (see 
Block and Strzepek 2010). IMPEND is a water accounting and optimization model that 
uses information on streamflow, evapotranspiration and reservoir attributes to determine 
energy generation and associated project costs. For the baseline scenario, IMPEND was 
calibrated to the Ministry of Energy’s planned thermal, hydropower and renewable 
capacity expansion plan for 2010–50, as well as to streamflow and evapotranspiration 
results from CLIRUN and WRM. IMPEND was then rerun for the four climate change 
scenarios, initially assuming no change in the baseline’s expansion plan (i.e., deviations 
in hydropower generation are solely attributable to climate change and not to changes in 
dam construction). 
Sector model 2: infrastructure  
Infrastructure in Mozambique is particularly vulnerable to major floods, which 
frequently destroy roads and bridges. High temperatures also damage road surfaces and 
increase maintenance costs. We develop a new road infrastructure model called 
‘CLIROAD’ that captures the effects of atmospheric conditions, including flooding, on 
road stocks and maintenance costs. About 80 per cent of Mozambique’s road network 
consists of unpaved roads, of which only 65 per cent are in good condition. 
Maintenance costs are high, and for the current network, amount to 12 per cent of total 
government spending (i.e., recurrent plus investment).  
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CLIROAD tracks the life-cycle of road vintages of different types (i.e., paved and 
unpaved, and primary, second and tertiary) and measures the annual dose-response 
relationship between climate and maintenance needs. More specifically, temperature 
and precipitation damage road surfaces and shorten their lifespan when climate stress 
exceeds engineering thresholds defined by the design standard to which a road vintage 
was built. Flooding damage depends on the severity of the flood (i.e., its ‘return period’ 
or RP). CLIROAD then calculates total maintenance costs (based on fixed unit costs), 
and this amount is removed from public road spending, whose growth rate is determined 
exogenously. Any remaining public transport funds are used to expand the network of 
paved and unpaved roads. Separate CLIROAD models are developed for each of the 
three subnational regions. The models are calibrated to current road network data, 
expected road investment plans, and to temperature and precipitation from the baseline 
and climate change projections.  
Sector model 3: agriculture  
Agriculture is one of Mozambique’s most important sectors, accounting for a fifth of 
national income and four-fifths of total employment. The sector is dominated by small-
scale farmers growing food crops (mainly maize and cassava) on rainfed land without 
the use of modern inputs. Some export crops are produced on larger-scale estates using 
irrigation. However, despite irrigation potential of 3.3 million hectares, only 50,000 
hectares are currently irrigated (mainly for sugarcane). Moreover, according to the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s capital expenditure plans, the amount of irrigated land will 
only double over coming decades. Mozambique will thus remain vulnerable to climate 
change effects on rainfed agriculture. 
We use a generic crop model called ‘CLICROP’ to simulate the impact of the baseline 
and climate change scenarios on rainfed and irrigated crop yields and on irrigation water 
demand. CLICROP was specifically designed to capture climate change impacts since it 
models water stress from both insufficient and excess water supply (measured daily). 
The inclusion of water-logging is an extension over simpler models, such as the FAO’s 
CROPWAT. Moreover, CLICROP’s daily time scale allows it to capture the shorter but 
higher intensity rainfall and the overall drier conditions expected in Southern Africa as a 
result of climate change (Solomon et al. 2007).  
The effects of the atmosphere (i.e., temperature and precipitation) are modelled 
indirectly in CLICROP via evapotranspiration (see Allen et al. 1998) and infiltration to 
the soil layers (based on soil properties). Soil moisture is calculated in each soil layer, 
including the moisture allowed to percolate into deep soil layers. Water balances and the 
upward flow of soil water are then measured. Crop yields are estimated using the 
approach of Allen et al. (1998). Water-logging reduces yields via oxygen loss and root 
growth hindrance (see Sieben 1964). We do not include the effects of CO2 fertilization.  
Separate crop models were developed for the 14 major crops in each of the three 
subnational regions of Mozambique.3 CLICROP was calibrated to information on soil 
parameters from the FAO soils database (e.g., field capacity, wilting point and saturated 
hydraulic conductivity) and historic crop yields and current irrigation patterns from the 
                                                
3  Crops include cassava, groundnuts, maize, millet, potatoes, sorghum, soybeans, sweet potatoes and 
wheat. 
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Ministry of Agriculture. Unlike the other two sector analyses, which use monthly data, 
CLICROP uses daily temperature and precipitation projections (5°x5°) from the 
baseline scenario and four selected GCMs.  
Sector model 4: coastal zones and sea-level rise 
Flooding in Mozambique occurs most frequently in areas close to river basins, in low-
lying areas, and in areas with poor drainage. Mozambique is vulnerable to flooding 
since most of its coastline shares these properties. During 1958–2008, the country 
recorded 20 major flood events affecting more than 9 million people (INGC 2009). 
Mozambique is also vulnerable to storm surges since more than 60 per cent of its 
population lives in coastal areas. From 1994–2008 the Northern, Central and Southern 
regions of the country were hit by two, three and two cyclones, respectively, with 
varying strengths at landfall (i.e., category 1–3) (INGC 2009). Moreover, the World 
Bank (2009a) suggests that, on average, Mozambique will be hit by cyclones three 
times a year. The country is therefore vulnerable to climate change impacts along its 
coastline. 
Sea-level rise (SLR) is a global phenomenon. Accordingly, we draw on the results of a 
global climate change study (World Bank 2009b) that used the ‘DIVA’ model (i.e., 
dynamic and interactive vulnerability assessment). DIVA is an integrated model of 
coastal systems that assesses the biophysical impacts of SLR and socioeconomic 
development taking into account coastal erosion, coastal flooding, wetland change and 
salinity intrusion into deltas (see Hinkel and Klein 2009). DIVA uses information on 
land-use, coastal population growth and economic growth to determine a range of 
outcomes, including lands permanently lost due to SLR. World Bank (2009b) used 
DIVA to assess the risk and cost of SLR on the coast of Mozambique, but did not 
consider cyclonic storm surges. Therefore, our analysis of the economy-wide impacts of 
climate change also excludes cyclone damages. 
2.3 Multisector economic model  
Sector model results are passed down to a DCGE model of Mozambique, which 
estimates the economic impact of the baseline and climate change scenarios, including 
spillovers from the four focal sectors to the rest of economy (i.e., indirect or economy-
wide linkages). Our DCGE model belongs to the structural neoclassical class of CGE 
models (see Dervis et al. 1982).4 Such DCGE models are well-suited to analysing 
climate change. First, they simulate the functioning of a market economy, including 
markets for labour, capital and commodities, and therefore can evaluate how changing 
economic conditions are mediated via prices and markets. Second, DCGE models 
ensure that all economy-wide constraints are respected, which is crucial for long run 
climate change projections. Finally, CGE models contain detailed sector breakdowns 
and provide a ‘simulation laboratory’ for quantitatively examining how the individual 
impact channels of climate change influence the performance and structure of the whole 
economy. 
                                                
4 For a detailed specification of the generic DCGE model, see Thurlow (2004). For recent applications 
of the Mozambique model, see Arndt et al. (2008, 2010). 
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Economic decision-making in the DCGE model is the outcome of decentralized 
optimization by producers and consumers within a coherent economy-wide framework. 
A variety of substitution mechanisms occur in response to variations in relative prices, 
including substitution between factors, between imports and domestic goods, and 
between exports and domestic sales.5 The Mozambique model contains 56 activities or 
sectors, including electricity generation, transport services and 24 agricultural 
subsectors (see McCool et al. 2009). Five factors of production are identified: three 
types of labour (unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled), agricultural land and capital. The 
agricultural activities and land are distributed across the three subnational regions 
(North, Centre and South). This sectoral and regional detail captures Mozambique’s 
economic structure and influences model results.  
Climate change affects economic growth and welfare in the DCGE model via four 
principal mechanisms. First, productivity changes in rainfed agriculture are taken from 
CLICROP and the DCGE then determines how much resources should be devoted to 
each crop given their profitability relative to other activities (i.e., ‘endogenous 
adaptation’). Second, the DCGE model directly incorporates fluctuations in hydropower 
production from IMPEND. River flows only affect crop production if the irrigated area 
available for planting exceeds the maximum potential area that could be irrigated given 
water availability constraints. Third, the length of regional road networks from 
CLIROAD is used in the DCGE model to determine the productivity of transport 
services. A shorter road network lowers transport productivity and increases the cost of 
moving goods between producers and consumers. Finally, the DCGE model 
incorporates the effects of SLR by reducing the total amount of cultivable land in each 
region by the land inundation estimates from DIVA. Other potential impact channels are 
recognized but not explicitly considered, such as health and tourism.  
The long timeframe over which climate change will unfold implies that dynamic 
processes are important. The recursive dynamic specification of our CGE model allows 
it to capture annual changes in the rate of physical and human capital accumulation and 
technical change. So, for example, if climate change reduces agricultural or hydropower 
production in a given year, it also reduces income and hence savings. This reduction in 
savings displaces investment and lowers production potential.6 Similarly, higher road 
maintenance costs imply less infrastructure investment and shorter road networks both 
now and in the future. Extreme events, such as flooding, also destroy infrastructure with 
lasting effects. Generally, even small differences in accumulation can cause large 
differences in economic outcomes over long time periods. Our DCGE model is well 
suited to capture these path dependent effects. 
 
                                                
5 Production and trade function elasticities were drawn from Dimaranan (2006).  
6 Given our long run focus, our macroeconomic ‘closure’ assumes that changes in aggregate absorption 
are proportionally distributed across nominal private and public consumption and investment via 
distribution neutral changes in savings rates (see Lofgren et al. 2004). Government savings are 
flexible, tax rates are fixed and the real exchange rate adjusts to maintain an exogenously determined 
current account balance.  
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3 Results: climate change impacts  
3.1 Baseline scenario 
In order to estimate the economic cost of climate change for Mozambique, it is 
necessary to first specify a baseline scenario that reflects development trends, policies 
and priorities in the absence of climate change. The baseline provides a reasonable 
trajectory for growth and structural change of the economy from 2003 to 2050 that can 
be used as a basis for comparison.  
Economic growth in the DCGE model is determined by rates of factor accumulation and 
technical change. For population and labour supply, we follow World Bank (2009b) and 
assume that Mozambique’s population will continue to grow but at a decelerating rate 
(i.e., 2 per cent today falling to 0.4 per cent by 2050). We assume that the expansion of 
cultivated crop land will slow alongside unskilled labour, with growth in agricultural 
production increasingly dependent on the adoption of improved technologies rather than 
land expansion. As described earlier, the crop models use historical climate data to 
define year-on-year yield fluctuations in the baseline for each crop and region. 
Improvements in the education levels of Mozambique’s workforce observed over the 
last decade are assumed to continue, with productivity rising faster for skilled and semi-
skilled workers than for unskilled workers (i.e., at 2 and 1.5 per cent per year, 
respectively, compared to 0.5 per cent). Baseline annual growth in hydropower 
generation and regional road networks are determined by the sector models using 
historical climate data. Under the above assumptions, Mozambique’s economy 
gradually develops, with agriculture’s contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) 
falling from 26 to 16 per cent during 2003–50. Overall, per capita GDP grows at about 2 
per cent per year in the baseline, leading to significant improvements in average 
household welfare.  
3.2 Sector-level impacts  
We first present the estimated biophysical impacts of climate change from the sector 
models. Table 2 reports deviations in average annual maize and cassava yields from the 
baseline for each climate change scenario for 2003–50. These are two of the 14 crops 
modelled using CLICROP. It should be noted that the crop model’s predicted yields are 
determined by daily temperature and precipitation and water-logging, which makes 
direct comparisons with the atmospheric changes in Table 1 difficult. However, 
consistent with precipitation changes, the impact of climate change on crop yields is not 
always negative. For example, Southern cassava yields decline significantly in the local 
dry scenario, but increase in the local wet scenario. Yield impacts vary across crops, 
based in part on their physiological characteristics and growing periods. For example, 
Southern cassava yields decline but maize yields increase in the two global scenarios. 
Overall, the crop model results suggest that the impact of climate change on crop yields 
is worst under the local dry scenario, although some crops and regions will benefit in 
other climate change scenarios.  
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Table 2: Changes in crop yields due to climate change for selected crops  
 Average change in yield from baseline, 2041–50 (%) 
 Global wet Global dry Local wet Local dry 
Cassava     
North region 2.01 -3.44 -0.09 -6.51 
Centre region -4.75 -6.24 -3.10 -6.21 
South region -9.36 -3.27 0.36 -3.20 
Maize     
North region 1.27 -1.32 -2.92 -1.87 
Centre region 0.34 0.64 -3.04 -5.59 
South region 3.49 6.37 -4.36 -3.95 
Source: Results from CLICROP. 
Table 3: Predicted frequency and severity of floods in the Central region 
Return 
period 
Number of years with floods of given return periods, 2003–50 
Baseline Global wet Global dry Local wet Local dry 
0–2 31 21 17 32 34 
2–5 12 19 17 13 11 
5–10 0 1 4 0 0 
10–20 0 0 1 1 1 
20–50 3 3 1 0 1 
50+ 2 4 8 2 1 
Notes: A flood’s ‘return period’ is a measure of its severity and expected frequency  
 (e.g., an RP50 flood is a relatively severe 1–in–50 year event). 
Source: Results from CLIRUN. 
Table 3 reports the frequency of flood events of different severities predicted by the 
river basin models. For example, 31 floods with RPs of less than 2 (i.e., roughly a 
‘normal’ year) occurred in the baseline scenario, whereas there were only two events 
with RPs of 50 or higher – one of which was the major flood in 2000. CLIRUN predicts 
only slight changes in flooding patterns for the local wet and local dry scenarios. This is 
partly because Mozambique lies at the end of large transboundary river basins, so floods 
are often determined by climate patterns in upstream countries. Indeed, the scenario 
with the highest frequency of severe floods is the global dry scenario. Although this 
scenario is dry from a global perspective, it is a wet scenario for the Southern African 
river basins affecting Mozambique. This is evident in Table 3, where the number of 
floods with RPs greater than 50 rises from two in the baseline to eight in the global dry 
scenario. Flooding from upstream basins is also more frequent in the global wet 
scenario, but is less severe in the local dry scenario.  
Flooding is a major source of road network damages in the transport infrastructure 
model. Table 4 reports changes in the length of the national road network by 2050 
relative to the baseline (see the ‘without adaptation’ column). The scenario with the most 
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Table 4: Road infrastructure damages caused by climate change 
 Change in national road network length relative to 
baseline, 2050 (%) 
 Without 
adaptation 
With 
adaptation 
Baseline 0.0 1.1 
Global wet -16.1 -9.0 
Global dry -22.4 -14.0 
Local wet -11.9 -4.0 
Local dry -2.1 2.9 
Source: Results from CLIROAD. 
Table 5: Changes in hydropower generation due to climate change  
 Average annual production (Gigawatt hours per year) 
 
Baseline 
Change from baseline (%) 
 Global wet Global dry Local wet Local dry 
2003–50 22,245 -2.50 -0.35 -5.81 -7.97 
2003–10 13,533 1.09 0.26 -3.07 -5.31 
2011–20 17,391 -2.35 -0.55 -7.36 -6.62 
2021–30 26,991 -1.82 0.40 -5.30 -6.75 
2031–40 26,087 -3.94 -0.62 -8.08 -7.26 
2041–50 25,479 -3.37 -0.98 -4.15 -12.04 
Source: Results from IMPEND. 
flooding (i.e., global dry) also has the largest decline in road stocks. However, the road 
network also contracts slightly in the climate change scenario with the fewest major 
floods (i.e., local dry). This is due to higher temperatures, which damage road surfaces 
and increase maintenance costs, thus reducing the funds available for new road 
development. Overall, climate change is expected to have a significant, negative impact 
on road infrastructure, especially under the wetter regional conditions of the global dry 
scenario.  
Finally, Table 5 reports changes in hydropower generation from IMPEND. Production 
expands rapidly in the first two decades of the baseline due to planned dam investments, 
such as the Nphanda Nkuwa dam, which is due for completion in 2015 with capacity 
similar to Cahora Bassa. Such rapid increases in capacity far exceed domestic demand 
projections, so Mozambique remains a net energy exporter throughout the baseline. 
Moreover, even the large reduction in hydropower generation in the local dry scenario, 
where streamflows are lowest, is insufficient to reverse Mozambique’s net exporting 
position. Climate change’s impact on the energy sector is therefore unlikely to constrain 
urban or industrial expansion within Mozambique.  
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Table 6: Economy-wide impacts of climate change 
 Baseline Global 
wet 
Global 
dry 
Local 
wet 
Local 
dry 
Average annual real per capita absorption 
growth rate, 2003–50 (%) 
2.12 1.85 1.74 1.91 2.03 
Deviation from baseline - -0.27 -0.38 -0.20 -0.09 
Average annual undiscounted value of 
absorption, 2046–50 (US$ billions, 2003 
prices) 
15.86 14.12 13.42 14.51 15.21 
Deviation from baseline - -1.74 -2.44 -1.35 -0.65 
Accumulated discounted deviation in 
absorption from baseline, 2003-50 (US$ 
billions, 2003 prices) 
- 4.93 7.42 4.40 2.29 
Accrued during 2010s - 0.62 1.04 0.64 0.39 
Accrued during 2020s - 1.03 1.57 0.94 0.45 
Accrued during 2030s - 1.45 2.07 1.20 0.53 
Accrued during 2040s - 1.77 2.48 1.36 0.67 
Due to crop yields and sea-level rise - 0.36 1.21 0.94 1.61 
Due to flooding and road damages - 4.56 6.21 3.42 0.63 
Due to declining hydropower generation - 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05 
Deviation in average annual real per capita 
GDP growth rate from baseline, 2003–50 (%)
     
Agriculture - -0.28 -0.40 -0.21 -0.09 
Industry      
Services - -0.21 -0.30 -0.15 -0.14 
0 39 0 54 0 30 0 09North region - -0.24 -0.35 -0.18 -0.08 
Centre region      
South region - -0.17 -0.32 -0.17 -0.13 
Source: Results from the DCGE model. 
3.3 Economy-wide impacts  
The DCGE model uses the sector results to estimate the economic impacts of climate 
change. The results of this economy-wide analysis are summarized in Table 6. We focus 
on changes in ‘absorption’, which is the broadest measure of welfare in the economy. 
Absorption tracks an economy’s use of goods for household consumption (C), 
investment (I) and government expenditure (G). Absorption is closely related to GDP 
growth. Formally, absorption (A) is defined as A=C+I+G. Recalling that 
GDP=C+I+G+X-M, where X is exports and M is imports, we can write that 
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A=GDP+M-X. In other words, absorption is the volume of goods produced by the 
economy plus the goods that foreigners supply to the economy (imports) less the goods 
sent out to foreigners (exports). In the Mozambican context, the focus on absorption is 
preferred because large foreign investments have the potential to add significantly to 
GDP but little to absorption. For example, the country’s large aluminium smelter, 
Mozal, accounts for 10 per cent of national GDP, yet because it is export-oriented, 
capital intensive and profits are remitted, it adds little to national absorption. Similarly, 
if most hydropower revenues are repatriated to cover dam construction costs, then it too 
will have only a small effect on national welfare. 
Table 6 reports average annual growth rates of real per capita absorption over the entire 
2003–50 simulation period. Climate change reduces absorption or national welfare in all 
four scenarios. The largest reduction is in the global dry scenario, which registers a 0.38 
percentage point decline in absorption growth (i.e., from 2.12 per cent in the baseline to 
1.74 per cent). By contrast, the local dry scenario results in the smallest reduction in 
absorption. Again, it may seem counterintuitive that the driest global scenario produces 
worse results than the driest local scenario. However, as the river basin models showed, 
the global dry scenario is in fact a very wet scenario for Southern Africa as a whole. As 
discussed below, this causes flooding damages which dominate overall economic losses 
from climate change in Mozambique. Similarly it might also seem counterintuitive that 
the global dry scenario, for being so wet, is in fact not the wettest local scenario. 
However, this highlights the importance of taking a regional perspective when assessing 
climate change impacts. In this case, it is climate patterns in upstream countries that 
determine major flooding in Mozambique, rather than climate patterns within the 
country itself.  
Climate change reduces average annual absorption growth rates by at most 0.38 
percentage points. However, even small reductions in rates of growth over a 50-year 
period eventually accumulate and result in significant differences in absorption levels 
by 2050. Table 6 reports the average annual level of absorption during the five-year 
period 2046–50. In the worst performing global dry scenario, the level of total 
absorption is only 85 per cent of baseline levels. Even in the best performing local dry 
scenario, absorption falls to 96 per cent of baseline levels. This means that, by the mid-
century, national welfare in Mozambique could be as much as 15 per cent lower as a 
result of climate change. 
We estimate the total economic cost of climate change, measured as the cumulative loss 
or deviation in national absorption from the baseline using a 5 per cent annual discount 
rate. In the global dry scenario, the total discounted cost throughout 2003–50 amounts 
to US$7.4 billion (measured in 2000 prices). This amount is roughly equivalent to 
Mozambique’s GDP in 2003. Total losses in the local dry scenario still amount to 
US$2.3 billion. Table 6 decomposes these costs and shows that climate change impacts 
become larger through time. For example, one seventh of the damages from climate 
change in the global dry scenario occur during the 2010s, while a third of the damages 
occur in the final decade of our analysis. This escalation of costs reflects the 
compounding effects of reduced accumulation rates, as well as the worsening impacts of 
climate change towards the middle of the century. It should be noted that most GCMs 
predict a pronounced aggravation of climate change impacts during the second half of 
the century. While the time horizon of our analysis ends in 2050, there is little doubt 
that, were the timeframe extended, the tendency for later periods to exhibit 
progressively stronger impacts would certainly remain and likely strengthen.  
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A principal feature of the DCGE model is its ability to evaluate the relative importance 
of different sector impacts. Table 6 decomposes the costs of climate change into three 
channels: crop yields and SLR, transportation system and hydropower.7 The table 
shows the dominant role played by transport system disruption, principally, but not 
exclusively, as a result of flooding. As mentioned above, the global dry scenario is in 
fact a very wet scenario for the broader region, and so causes significant flooding. By 
contrast, the local dry scenario generates fewer floods and transport damages, but has a 
more adverse effect on agriculture.  
The impacts of climate change on infrastructure are strong because they endure. A 
drought may reduce agricultural output dramatically during a particular cropping 
season, with strong implications for the welfare of households. However, in the 
following year, crop production typically returns to normal levels if rains return. An 
increase in the variance of agricultural production will have little impact on long run 
growth so long as underlying rates of factor accumulation and technical improvement 
remain relatively constant. 
The same applies for hydropower. Reduced streamflow leads to reduced energy output. 
However, when streamflow returns, so does energy production. Hydropower also has 
limited impact on absorption in Mozambique because of the important role of foreign 
financing in dam construction. The model repatriates four-fifths of hydropower net 
revenues abroad in order to cover dam construction costs. While this provides a 
reasonable risk-adjusted return to investors, it also implies that hydropower investments 
have a muted impact on total absorption, at least over the repayment period.  
Flood-induced destruction of infrastructure is different from the other impact channels 
because its effects endure. Once a road is washed away, its negative effect remains until 
the road is rebuilt. However, with constant resources allocated to roads, reconstruction 
of a section of road that is washed away due to heavy rainfall or flooding implies fewer 
resources available for construction of new roads or regular rehabilitation of existing 
roads. The large distances and dispersed nature of production in Mozambique reinforce 
the importance of the road network. Earlier analyses have highlighted the large 
differences between farm/factory gate prices and prices paid by final users (Tarp et al. 
2002) as well as the substantial gains to the economy that can be obtained from 
reduction in these margins (Arndt et al. 2000). By implication, damages to road 
infrastructure increase the implicit distance between producer and final user, raising 
consumer prices and lowering producer earnings. Disruptions to the transport sector 
therefore have important economy-wide implications, well beyond the transport sector 
itself. 
Finally, we consider the sectoral and regional impacts of climate change. This is shown 
in Table 6 as deviations in average annual real per capita GDP growth from the 
baseline. Note that in all scenarios, including the baseline, agriculture grows more 
slowly than either industry or services. Given the higher concentration of industry and 
services in the Centre and South, this translates into slower economic growth in the 
North. The DCGE model results indicate that all sectors and regions are negatively 
                                                
7 The impact of SLR via agricultural land losses is small and so is grouped with crop yield losses. 
Impacts may be larger were we to include climate change’s effects on the frequency and severity of 
cyclones and storm surges or damages to urban infrastructure. 
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affected by climate change. The largest decline in growth rates relative to the baseline is 
in agriculture and in the North, where agriculture dominates the local economy. The 
large metropolitan centre of Maputo in the South means that a larger share of this 
region’s economy is relatively insulated from the direct effects of climate change. As 
such, the South experiences smaller declines in GDP than elsewhere in the country. 
In summary, national welfare declines under all four of the selected climate change 
scenarios. The largest losses occur in the global dry scenario and, after discounting, 
amount to a total US$7.4 billion over the period 2003–50. Second, economic losses 
caused by climate change grow substantially over time, highlighting the importance of 
responding early to mitigate climate change and to adapt to new climate conditions. 
Finally, while agriculture is adversely affected by climate change, it is major flooding 
and the damage it causes to transport infrastructure that dominates overall welfare losses 
in Mozambique. Unlike agriculture, which directly contributes to economic growth, 
transport services have a more indirect impact on the rest of the economy, thus 
illustrating the advantages of our integrated sector and economy-wide analysis.  
4 Results: adaptation options 
In the previous section we measured the economic cost of climate change in terms of 
the damages it causes. However, the cost of adaptation is not necessarily equal to those 
damages. Moreover, it may not be economically sensible to direct adaptation resources 
towards damaged areas. For example, hard adaptation investments to protect coastal 
regions may prove more costly than the damages themselves. By contrast, soft 
adaptation options, such as rezoning vulnerable investments away from high risk areas, 
may prove more cost effective in the long run. In this section we examine selected 
adaptation options and use our integrated modelling framework to estimate their 
effectiveness in offsetting the costs of climate change. 
The DCGE model captures some endogenous or ‘autonomous’ adaptation. If climate 
change adversely affects one sector, then the model responds by reallocating resources 
towards areas with greater returns according to price signals. However, our previous 
simulations did not involve any adaptation in the form of policy changes. For example, 
our results indicate that road damages account for most of the economic cost of climate 
change. Yet we did not modify transport policy. Railways, for instance, are typically 
less sensitive to precipitation than roads and can withstand more severe floods. Coastal 
shipping is also less exposed to flooding, although it is vulnerable to other phenomena 
such as cyclones. 
In this section we explore adaptation options to offset the national welfare losses caused 
by the most severe global dry climate change scenario. Table 7 presents the adaptation 
scenarios and their implications for national welfare. The first column reports the 
average absorption growth rate from the baseline, and so is the same for all climate 
change scenarios. The second column reports climate change impacts and corresponds 
to Table 6. The remaining columns report results for the adaptation scenarios, which are 
modelled in three steps. First, we start from the climate change scenarios (column 2) 
and then adjust transport policies (column 3), thereby reducing the gap in growth rates  
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Table 7: Economy-wide impacts of alternative adaptation scenarios 
 Average annual real per capita absorption growth rate, 2003–50 (%) 
 Baseline 
scenario 
Climate 
change 
scenario 
Adaptation scenarios 
 Transport 
policy 
Agricultural 
extension 
Irrigation 
investment 
Education 
policy 
 (1) (2) (3 = 2+) (4 = 3+) (5 = 3+) (6 = 3+) 
Global wet 2.12 1.85 1.93 2.23 1.96 2.23 
Global dry  2.12 1.74 1.81 2.12 1.84 2.12 
Local wet 2.12 1.91 1.97 2.27 2.00 2.28 
Local dry 2.12 2.03 2.05 2.33 2.08 2.36 
Source: Results from the DCGE model. 
between climate change and baseline scenarios. The remaining three columns 4–6 
contain the effects of the transport policy as well as either (i) expanded research and 
extension to increase the rate of technical progress in agriculture (ii) expanded 
investment in irrigation infrastructure or (iii) enhanced education investment to 
accelerate human capital accumulation. It is important to note that the final three 
adaptation policies are undertaken separately (i.e., all results in columns 4–6 should be 
compared to those in column 3).  
4.1 Adjusting transport policy 
Flooding in the transport sector incurs substantial damages, especially for unpaved 
roads. 10 per cent of Mozambique’s transport budget is allocated to flood-damaged 
roads – an allocation that would need to increase under climate change. However, given 
limited public resources, repairing flood-damaged roads implies lower spending on new 
road construction and regular maintenance, leading to shorter national road networks 
under all climate change scenarios (see Table 4). To offset these damages, we consider a 
change in transport policy that seals unpaved roads granting them resilience to 
precipitation similar to that of paved roads. We assume that new sealed roads could be 
constructed for a 10 per cent increment in construction costs, or existing roads sealed 
during their regular 20-year rehabilitation for a 10 per cent increment in rehabilitation 
costs. The dose-response coefficients (i.e., flooding, precipitation and temperature) for 
paved roads are also applied to sealed (formally unpaved) roads. This shift in design 
standards is modelled within CLIROAD and the results are passed down to the DCGE 
model. 
The change in transport policy increases the stock of roads by 2050 under all climate 
change scenarios (see Table 4). This halves the decline in absorption caused by climate 
change under the global dry scenario (see Table 7). Moreover, this adaptation scenario 
assumes that the allocation of public funds to the transport sector remains unchanged 
from the baseline, implying that reductions in climate change damages are attained 
without any additional resources. Thus, while networks may be shorter in the near term 
due to the higher construction and rehabilitation costs of sealed roads, in the long run 
this is more than offset by the greater climate-resilience of the road network. Equally 
important to note is the slight increase in road coverage even under baseline conditions, 
which implies that our adaptation policy is advisable even without climate change (i.e., 
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current design standards are suboptimal under historical climate conditions). These 
findings indicate that adjusting road design standards is a cost effective, ‘no-regret’ 
adaptation option for Mozambique. 
4.2 Investing in agriculture and education 
The remaining adaptation policies reported in columns 4–6 of Table 7 require additional 
resources. The maximum resource envelope is derived from the cumulative discounted 
damages presented in Table 6 for the global dry scenario (i.e., the worst case climate 
change scenario). The present value of the US$7.4 billion in damages is equivalent to an 
annual resource transfer equal to about US$400 million. Given this resource envelope, 
we consider what improvements in agricultural technology, irrigation or human capital 
investment would be needed to close the remaining gap with the baseline scenario (i.e., 
each remaining adaptation policy is considered in isolation of the other two).  
We find that improving agricultural productivity and human capital accumulation can 
plausibly close the remaining absorption gap under the global dry scenario. For 
agricultural research and extension, a 1.2 per cent acceleration in agriculture’s 
productivity growth rate is sufficient to return absorption to its baseline growth rate of 
2.12 per cent per year in the global dry scenario (see Table 7: column 4). Since global 
dry is the worst case scenario, improving agricultural productivity raises absorption 
growth rates above the baseline in other climate change scenarios. This accelerated rate 
of technical advance is achievable within the maximum budget envelope, due to the 
large gap between Mozambique’s high agricultural potential and low attainment. For 
example, if the elasticity of agricultural productivity growth with respect to public 
agricultural spending is 0.3 (see Mogues and Benin, forthcoming), then we estimate that 
the agricultural growth target is achievable for a total US$1.35 billion (discounted at 5 
per cent over 2003–50).8 The cost of this adaptation is well below the value of damages, 
even in less severe climate change scenarios. Moreover, agricultural intensification is 
consistent with Mozambique’s existing development goals, suggesting that investing in 
agriculture is also a no-regret adaptation option. 
For education policy, we increase the proportion of the workforce that has primary and 
secondary schooling. More specifically, the annual growth rate of secondary/tertiary 
educated skilled labour increases by one percentage point (i.e., from about 2 to 3 per 
cent per year). Similarly, the growth increment for primary educated semi-skilled labour 
is 0.8 percentage points, bringing annual growth to 2.3 per cent. Finally, unskilled 
labour’s growth rate declines by 0.6 percentage points in order to maintain the same 
sized workforce as in the baseline. The scenario is equivalent to about a tenth of the 
workforce completing primary schooling and is sufficient to close the remaining 
absorption deficit caused by climate change. A detailed costing of this change in 
education policy is beyond the scope of our study, but appears plausible within a budget 
considerably less than the maximum US$400 million per year. The education scenario 
also illustrates how it may not be necessary to direct adaptation resources towards 
damaged areas in order to reclaim the losses caused by climate change. Indeed, more 
rapid economic development may prove an effective adaptation strategy. 
                                                
8 Assuming that government spending remains at 10 per cent of GDP and agricultural spending remains 
at 10 per cent of the total government budget.  
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Finally, we increase the amount of irrigated land in Mozambique by more than one 
million hectares. This is equivalent to irrigating about one sixth of cultivated lands by 
2050. We find that this has only little effect on absorption. This is because, as additional 
lands come under irrigation, the returns to agricultural land and capital decline 
significantly (i.e., diminishing returns). Without access to foreign markets, the decline 
in prices caused by rapidly expanding irrigation and agricultural production limits the 
gains from these investments. Overall, irrigation reduces the damages caused by climate 
change by US$0.6 billion over 2003–50. This is sufficient to offset the remaining 
damages from climate change under the local dry scenario (after adjusting transport 
policies). However, it is far smaller than the additional US$4.9 billion required in the 
global dry scenario. Irrigation therefore appears to be a less effective means of adapting 
to climate change in Mozambique. 
5 Conclusion 
Our model results indicate that, without changes in policy, climate change causes 
economic damages between US$2.3 billion and US$7.4 billion during 2003–50 
(discounted and in 2003 prices). The source of these damages varies across climate 
change scenarios. A third of damages in the worst case scenario occur during the final 
decade of our analysis, and are mainly due to flooding and its effect on infrastructure. 
We find that damages in Mozambique are more related to river basin conditions within 
Southern Africa, than they are to climate patterns within Mozambique itself. Only in the 
local dry scenario were local precipitation projections more important, with flood 
frequency declining and agriculture emerging as the primary source of damages. 
Each of the climate change scenarios considered here reduce national welfare. This 
confirms the need for an adaptation strategy for Mozambique. Using our integrated 
modelling framework, we identified improved road design standards and agricultural 
investments as no-regret options. However, uncertainty over climate change scenarios 
makes it difficult to identify ex ante which other policy changes are required. 
Accordingly, the best adaptation to climate change may prove to be more rapid 
development leading to a more flexible and resilient society. An effective adaptation 
strategy should therefore reinforce existing development objectives. Here, our results 
confirm the importance of human capital. A more educated populace, supported by 
flexible and competent public and private institutions, will be better able to react to 
climate changes as they emerge.  
While advancing the development agenda is a good adaptation strategy, there are 
specific policies that emerge as direct responses to climate change. First, our analysis 
confirms the importance of cooperative river basin management, including the need for 
regional coordination in designing adaptation strategies. Second, investing in 
agricultural research and extension is a no-regret option. If climate change redirects 
resources away from agriculture causing its underlying rate of technical advancement to 
decline, then large welfare losses are almost inevitable. Third, sealed rural roads may 
cost more to construct but are more reliable than unpaved roads, and, if properly 
constructed, cost less over time due to reduced maintenance requirements. Fourth, soft 
adaptation options can be effective in avoiding damages caused by extreme events. 
Land use planning is a particularly powerful option since new capital investments over 
coming decades are likely to exceed already installed capital, which in turn will 
depreciate well in advance of the main onset of climate change. Finally, hard adaptation 
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options should be carefully scrutinized since, by reducing risk, they may increase 
exposure to extreme events. For example, building dikes may reduce the probability of 
storm surges damaging capital, but they will encourage investment behind the dike, and 
so increase damages when dikes are breeched. Together these adaptation options, while 
not exhaustive, provide a sound basis for countries like Mozambique to design 
adaptation strategies that are robust to the uncertainty of climate change. 
References 
Allen, R. G., Pereira, L. S., Raes, D. and Smith, M. (1998). ‘Crop Evapotranspiration: 
Guidelines for Computing Crop Water Requirements’. Irrigation and Drainage Paper 
56. Rome: FAO. 
Arndt, C., Benfica, R., Maximiano, N., Nucifora, A. and Thurlow, J. (2008). ‘Higher 
Fuel and Food Prices: Impacts and Responses for Mozambique’. Agricultural 
Economics, 39: 497–511. 
Arndt, C., Benefica, R., Tarp, F., Thurlow, J. and Uaiene, R. (2010). ‘Biofuels, Growth 
and Poverty: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis for Mozambique’. 
Environment and Development Economics, 15 (1): 81–105. 
Arndt, C., Jensen, H. T., Robinson, S. R. and Tarp, F. (2000). ‘Agricultural Technology 
and Marketing Margins in Mozambique’. Journal of Development Studies 37: 121–
37. 
Block, P., and Strzepek, K. (2010). ‘Economic Analysis of Large-scale Upstream River 
Basin Development on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia Considering Transient Conditions, 
Climate Variability, and Climate Change’. Journal of Water Resource Planning and 
Management, 136 (2): 156–66. 
Dervis, K., de Melo, J. and Robinson, S. (1982). General Equilibrium Models for 
Developing Countries. London: Cambridge University Press. 
Dimaranan, B. V. (ed.) (2006). Global Trade, Assistance, and Production: The GTAP 6 
Data Base. Purdue University: Center for Global Trade Analysis. 
Gupta, V. K., and Sorooshian, S. (1983). ‘Uniqueness and Observability of Conceptual 
Rainfall-Runoff Model Parameters: The Percolation Process Examined’. Water 
Resources Research, 19 (1): 269–76. 
—— (1985). ‘The Automatic Calibration of Conceptual Catchment Models Using 
Derivative-Based Optimization Algorithms’. Water Resources Research, 21 (4): 
473–86. 
Hargreaves, G. H., and Allen, R. G. (2003). ‘History and Evaluation of Hargreaves 
Evapotranspiration Equation’ Journal of Irrigation and Drainage Engineering 129 
(1): 53–63. 
Hinkel, J., and Klein, R. J. T. (2009). ‘The DINAS-COAST Project: Developing a Tool 
for the Dynamic and Interactive Assessment of Coastal Vulnerability’. Global 
Environmental Change, 19 (3): 384–95. 
 20
INGC (2009). Estudo Sobre o Impacto das Alterações Climáticas no Risco de 
Calamidades em Moçambique Relatório Síntese. Maputo: Instituto Nacional de 
Gestão de Calamidades.  
Kaczmarek, Z. (1993). ‘Water Balance Model for Climate Impact Analysis’. Acta 
Geophysica Polonica, 41: 1–16. 
Kaczmarek, Z. (1996). ‘Climate Change Impacts on the Water Supply System in the 
Warta River Catchment, Poland’. International Journal of Water Resources 
Development, 12 (2): 165–80. 
Lofgren, H., Robinson, S. and El-Said, M. (2002). ‘A Standard Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) Model in GAMS’. Washington, DC: International Food Policy 
Research Institute. 
McCool, C., Thurlow, J. and Arndt, C. (2009). ‘Documentation of Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) Development’. In C. Arndt and F. Tarp (eds) Taxation in a Low-
Income Economy: the Case of Mozambique. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Mogues, T., and Benin, S. (forthcoming). Public Expenditures for Agricultural and 
Rural Development in Africa. New York, NY: Routledge.  
Sieben, W. H. (1964). ‘Relation of Drainage Conditions and Crop Yields on Young 
Light Clay Soils in the Yssellake Polders’. Van Zee tot Land 40. 
Solomon, S., Qin, D., Manning, M., Chen, Z., Marquis, M., Averyt, K. B., Tignor, M. 
and Miller, H. L. (eds) (2007). Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Strzepek, K., Balaji, R., Rajaram, H. and Strzepek, J. (2008). ‘A Water Balance Model 
for Climate Impact Analysis of Runoff with Emphasis on Extreme Events’. Report 
prepared for the World Bank. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Tarp, F., Arndt, C., Jensen, H. T., Robinson, S. R. and Heltberg, R. (2002). Facing the 
Development Challenge in Mozambique: A General Equilibrium Perspective. 
Research Report 126. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Thurlow, J. (2004). ‘A Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model for 
South Africa: Extending the Static IFPRI Model’. Working Paper 1. Pretoria: Trade 
and Industrial Policy Strategies. 
World Bank (2009a) Mozambique: Economic Vulnerability and Disaster Risk 
Assessment. Washington, DC: World Bank, Africa Region. 
—— (2009b). The Costs to Developing Countries of Adapting to Climate Change: New 
Methods and Estimates, Global Report of the Economics of Adaptation to Climate 
Change Study. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Yates, D. N. (1996). ‘WatBal: An Integrated Water Balance Model for Climate Impact 
Assessment of River Basin Runoff’. International Journal of Water Resources 
Development, 12 (2): 121–39. 
 
 
